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In a relatively unusual move, thelegislature recently defunded the De-partment of Consumer Affairs' (DCA)
Board of Funeral Directors and Embalm-
ers (BFDE) and the Cemetery Board (CB),
effective January 1, 1995. The statutes
creating both boards still exist, as do the
licensing requirements for funeral direc-
tors, embalmers, crematories, and ceme-
teries. But, as of January 1, no agency will
exist to accept applications, license new
entrants, adopt professional standards and
ethics codes binding on the death services
industry, or police violations of those stan-
dards through an enforcement system.
Why? Because the legislature failed to
appropriate funds to finance the opera-
tions of either board after January 1, and
it also failed to authorize either board to
spend any money it may secure.
The last time the legislature did this,
we cried foul. But that was in 1992,
when the legislature defunded the Auc-
tioneer Commission in retaliation for a
lawsuit filed by the Commission chal-
lenging the legislature's theft of auction-
eer licensing fees from the Commission's
special fund. Then, as now, the legisla-
ture simply defunded an agency and left
the licensing requirement intact.1
In 1992, the legislature was bullying
a helpless agency which had the temerity
to file a meritorious suit against it. The
defendant essentially destroyed the
plaintiff in order to prevent a court from
forcing it to obey its own laws. In 1994,
however, the legislature is finally refus-
ing to kowtow to the bullying of a pow-
erful industry which has been allowed to
run amok in California for decades,
causing injury and grief to California
consumers at times when they least de-
serve either.
The Center for Public Interest Law
(CPIL) has monitored the activities of
both of these boards for 14 years. And
for 14 years, the California Regulatory
Law Reporter has documented their fail-
ure to do anything substantial about
well-known abuses within the death ser-
vices industry. These abuses range from
standard embezzlement of preneed ar-
rangement funds (which these licensees
are authorized to accept and invest), to
deceptive marketing practices through
the use of jargon-laden adhesive con-
tracts, to macabre incidents such as the
commingling of bodies for burial or cre-
mation and the theft of gold and jewelry
from dead bodies. These abuses have
victimized California consumers for de-
cades, and the boards' failure to police
the death services industry has now re-
sulted in:
- an excessive but necessary level of
oversight by both the executive and leg-
islative branches;
- an increased number of class actions
and other lawsuits against both boards'
licensees-this litigation is now clog-
ging and burdening our courts with dis-
putes these agencies should have either
prevented or addressed through their reg-
ulatory programs; and
- dozens of revealin and embarrass-
ing newspaper exposes.
Legislative Oversight. As these
abuses and their documentation mounted,
the legislature took a number of steps
which should have served as fair warn-
ing to both boards. In 1987, Senator Dan
Boatwright introduced a bill to merge the
boards;3 Assemblymember Jackie Speier
introduced legislation to abolish them in
1992.4 On three occasions since 1987,
the Legislative Analyst has called for the
elimination or merger of both boards.
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Over the past few years, the legislature
has been forced to hold several in-
vestigative hearings into the performance
of both of them. Between 1991 and
1993, the Assembly Consumer Protec-
tion Committee and the Senate Business
and Professions Committee held at least
two public hearings on them,6 and As-
sembly Consumer Protection Committee
Chair Jackie Speier joined with then-
DCA Director Jim Conran in a success-
ful effort to compel the long-overdue
resignations of both boards' executive
officers in 1993. 7
Executive Branch Oversight. Led by
former DCA Director Jim Conran, the
Wilson administration has consistently
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expressed its dissatisfaction with the per-
formance of both boards.8 Following the
forced resignation of their respective ex-
ecutive officers in 1993, Director Conran
convened a Summit on Funeral and Ce-
metery Services (aka "the Death Sum-
mit") on September 22, 1993, to examine
problems within the death services in-
dustry and changes to the existing regu-
latory structure which would address
them.9 In no uncertain terms, Conran
warned both boards that unless each im-
plemented swift and sweeping reforms,
he would support their abolition or trans-
formation into bureaus which would
function under his direct supervision.'
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Marketplace Flaws Justifying Regu-
lation. As the state's senior public inter-
est organization covering the regulation
of trades and professions, CPIL was in-
vited to represent consumers at the Death
Summit. We noted several marketplace
flaws which theoretically justify some
type of regulation of the death services
industry. The first is "external costs" or
"irreparable harm"-under our current
statutes, we allow these licensees to take,
invest, and administer millions of dollars
in preneed trusts and endowment care
funds, and there might be irreparable
harm in the form of permanent loss of
money if a funeral director or cemetery
licensee is dishonest or incompetent in
investing or managing these funds. A
regulatory system tailored to addressing
that flaw might require these licensees to
have training or education to ensure that
they have knowledge of their fiduciary
duty, as well as investment practices and
accounting. The regulatory mechanism
might also include some sort of fund or
bond to ensure that consumers who are
injured due to dishonesty or incompe-
tence could be compensated where the
licensee is insolvent.
The second flaw justifying some sort
of regulation is consumers' lack of infor-
mation about this industry-wherein de-
cisions are compelled in an adhesive set-
ting and market comparisons may be
problematical. More likely than not, we
"shop" for after-death services when we
are emotionally vulnerable, and the "re-
peat business" dynamic which serves to
excise incompetent or dishonest practi-
tioners from other industries doesn't re-
ally apply as readily to death services.
When we purchase goods and services
from this industry, we are presented with
boilerplate legalese documents filled
with jargon we don't understand, and
those documents do not change from en-
trepreneur to entrepreneur. The number
of entrepreneurs in the industry is soar-
ing in California, while the number of
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deaths in the state remains relatively
static. The high fixed costs inherent in a
funeral or cemetery business, coupled
with a finite amount of business and very
little competitive price advertising, re-
sults in extraordinary overpricing by the
industry in general and possible abuse of
consumers because of lack of informa-
tion.1 ' To address this flaw, our regula-
tory system should include stringent
"plain English" disclosure requirements
to ensure that consumers know what
they're purchasing and how much it's
costing them. No hidden costs, no hid-
den disclaimers.
The question we asked at the Death
Summit: Does the current regulatory sys-
tem address these flaws in any meaning-
ful way? Our answer: Absolutely not. Our
regulatory system includes two costly and
fragmented licensing boards to regulate
different (and competing) segments of
the same industry. And both boards have
utterly failed to address the reasons for
their existence.
The Boards'Records. In the area of
licensing standards, our system allows
funeral director and cemetery licensees
to take hundreds of thousands of dollars
in preneed arrangement money from
consumers and invest it, administer it,
account for it, and audit it. But our stat-
utes require nothing of these licensees to
ensure that they have the slightest idea
how to do any of this. Our system re-
quires them to be 18 years old, pay a
fee, and take a test which asks them
nothing about trusts, fiduciary duty, con-
tracts, or investments. There are no min-
imum educational requirements; licen-
sees don't even need a high school di-
ploma.
Further, both boards-at the behest of
the industry-have repeatedly avoided
the adoption and enforcement of strong
disclosure requirements. The minimal
standards which have been adopted by
either board are riddled with loopholes,
and-as discussed below-noncompli-
ance is routine and tolerated. For exam-
ple, we have watched the Funeral Board
attempt to adopt regulations to define
and prohibit the practice of "constructive
delivery" (whereby funeral directors di-
vert preneed trust funds from the trust
by delivering-not merchandise-but a
warehouse receipt for merchandise alleg-
edly paid for with trust funds and put in
storage). BFDE is fully aware of this prac-
tice and knows how it operates to swindle
consumers. On at least two occasions
(1990 and 1993), it has talked about adopt-
ing rules to eliminate this practice, 12 and
has only just adopted them in July 1994-
under threat of abolition.
Another example: Funeral directors
are known to advertise that they "arrange
cremation services" under the heading
"cremations" in the telephone directory,
although they are not authorized to per-
form cremations. The Attorney General
says this is deceptive advertising. 13 How-
ever, the boards disagree about the
proper interpretation of the Attorney
General's opinion; for seven years, they
have simply "agreed to disagree" and ig-
nored the opinion-leaving funeral di-
rectors free to engage in deceptive ad-
vertising.
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And the Cemetery Board is even
worse. Since 1975, its statute has re-
quired it to occasionally review and
amend its regulations regarding "stan-
dards of knowledge and experience and
financial responsibility" for cemetery
brokers. 15 However, the Board has never
complied; it has no regulations whatso-
ever regarding appropriate knowledge
and experience for trust fund administra-
tion and investment.
In addition to an inadequate licensing
system which fails to ensure competence
in the one area in which irreparable harm
can be caused, and little or no standard-
setting by either board to clarify to the
industry what is and is not acceptable,
neither board has an adequate enforce-
ment system to police and deter viola-
tions. During the past three fiscal years
for which statistics are available, the
Cemetery Board received a total of 339
complaints. It opened only 11 investiga-
tions and took only 2 disciplinary ac-
tion. 16 During those same years, BFDE
received a total of 506 complaints. It
opened 329 investigations, but took only
15 disciplinary actions.
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In 1993, the Department of Consumer
Affairs finally dispatched its auditors to
evaluate the required audits of the pre-
need trust funds at four funeral homes
which had been "performed" by BFDE
staff. The results were frightening. DCA
found that the Board's audits of these fu-
neral homes' preneed trust funds were
"seriously deficient"-the Board's audi-
tors failed to adhere to professional stan-
dards in the preparation of these audits
and DCA's review of the audits was ham-
pered by the poor quality of the work-
papers.'a Even worse, the DCA audit re-
vealed that the death services industry
pays no attention to BFDE. In these au-
dits, the Board told the homes to take
anywhere from 15-20 corrective actions,
including restitution of trust fund money
to consumers from 1990-1992, but the
homes completely ignored the Board's
orders. 19 The Board is perceived as a
toothless paper tiger by the very industry
it purports to regulate, perhaps because
it illustrates the most pernicious corrup-
tion of our system: the takeover of a pub-
lic agency by private profit-stake inter-
ests.
Recommendations for Reform... At
the Death Summit, we urged both boards
to consider sponsoring legislation or
adopting regulations requiring education,
training, and testing which guarantees
competence in the administration of pre-
need trusts; stronger "plain English" dis-
closure requirements for preneed and en-
dowment care contracts, so the average
consumer understands what he or she is
getting into; and the posting of an ap-
propriate bond to ensure that there is a
fund from which injured consumers may
be compensated. BFDE requires no bond
whatsoever; the Cemetery Board requires
a minimal $10,000 bond for brokers,20
and a $50,000 bond for cemeteries which
maintain endowment care funds.21 Sounds
good, but even this bond has failed to deter
wrongdoing. We argued that the $50,000
bond requirement should be applied to all
funeral directors and cemetery licensees
which accept preneed or endowment
care funds, and that the amount of the
bond should be increased as the amount
of money in the trust fund increases. The
Health and Safety Code makes provis-
ions for a less-than-$50,000 bond for
small cemeteries whose fund is
smal122 -why not require a larger bond
when the licensee has substantially more
than $50,000 in its fund?
We also argued that the two boards
were prime candidates for merger. There
is no reason to have two boards regulat-
ing competing segments of the same in-
dustry; our governmental structure need
not and should not reflect turf battles in
the industry. Many licensees in this in-
dustry are licensed by both boards any-
way-the boards should combine their
resources and take advantage of the
economies of scale inherent in a merger.
...Ignored by the Boards. Although
DCA Director Conran directed both
boards to present him with 30-, 60-, and
90-day reports on their progress in im-
plementing the reforms suggested at the
Death Summit, both boards ignored him.
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Neither board submitted any report what-
soever until mid-February 1994-that is,
until well after both boards had been in-
formed that Senator Dan McCorquodale
would soon introduce yet another bill to
abolish both boards and create a new reg-
ulatory structure.
SB 2037 (McCorquodale). Following
on the heels of the Death Summit, the
Senate Subcommittee on Efficiency and
Effectiveness in State Boards and Coin-
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missions held another oversight hearing
on the performance of both boards in
October 1993. In its final report issued
in April 1994, the Senate Subcommittee
recommended that both boards be abol-
ished and that their regulatory programs
be merged into a bureau, finding that:
. the boards' investigation and en-
forcement activities are "ineffective and
non-existent,"
* neither board ensures the compe-
tence of its licensees in preneed/ endow-
ment care trust fund investment and
management, and
- the boards are "very weak" in the
area of setting standards for the indus-
try.
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The Subcommittee's final report also
indicated that it did not favor a simple
combination of two ineffective boards. It
suggested instead that the new entity be
required to (1) adopt education, training,
and testing standards to ensure licensee
competence in their actual areas of prac-
tice; (2) establish stringent disclosure re-
quirements for preneed and endowment
care contracts; and (3) look into the pos-
sibility of imposing a bond requirement
to ensure that there is a fund from which
injured consumers may be compensated
should the licensee declare bankruptcy or
otherwise leave the jurisdiction. 25 To im-
plement the Subcommittee's findings, Sen-
ator McCorquodale introduced SB 2037,
which would have merged both boards into
a bureau functioning directly under the su-
pervision of the DCA Director. At the be-
hest of the boards and the industry trade
associations, the Senate Business and Pro-
fessions Committee amended SB 2037 on
May 18, 1994, to merge the two boards
into one board (instead of a bureau) and
directed the new entity to engage in
rulemaking to adopt strong consumer pro-
tection standards as recommended by the
Senate Subcommittee.26
To underscore and reinforce its sup-
port for the long-overdue structural
changes to these two boards then pending
in SB 2037, the legislature included in the
1994-95 budget bill-which Governor
Wilson signed on July 8, 1994-a provi-
sion appropriating only six months' worth
of funding for each board.2 7 SB 2037 was
to be the budget trailer bill carrying the
remainder of the 1994-95 funding for
merged board, and the continuation
funding was very clearly tied to and con-
ditioned upon the merger provision.2
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When SB 2037 reached the Assembly,
however, that house appeared to wilt
under the strong pressure exerted by the
death services industry to maintain the
status quo, and removed the merger pro-
vision. Although Senator McCorquo-
dale could have simply dropped the bill
to achieve defunding of both boards, he
sought and received the strong support
of his colleagues; by a 28-2 vote on Au-
gust 31, the full Senate refused to concur
in the Assembly's removal of the merger
provision and the bill died. As a result,
both boards will run out of funds by Jan-
uary 1, 1995.
Thus, the Department of Consumer
Affairs, whose sworn peace officers are
authorized to enforce the provisions of
the Business and Professions Code, has
offered to take over both boards' en-
forcement programs and to work with
the legislature on creating a new entity
which is authorized to license cemetery
brokers, crematories, funeral directors,
and embalmers. At this writing, neither
board has accepted DCA's offer, instead
demanding loans which will enable them
to exist beyond January I-loans which
the legislature will surely refuse to ap-
prove. After twenty years of complete
nonfeasance, both boards continue to de-
mand separate and continued existence.
Why These Boards Should Be
Merged. Several compelling reasons
justify the merger of these two boards.
First, contrary to the positions of the
boards and the industry, the death ser-
vices industry is one industry which
seeks accomplishment of one goal: the
preparation, care, and disposal of a dead
human body in the manner desired by a
decedent or his/her survivors. The two
boards, which represent two competing
components of the death services indus-
try, merely reflect two different ap-
proaches toward that same goal: funeral
and burial, or cremation. Simply put,
each board's licensees are authorized to
provide a service which the other board's
licensees are not-but frequently, the
services of both types of licensees are
required in order to achieve the desired
result. As noted above, the existence of
two separate boards reflects only the
industry's turf struggle-an inappropri-
ate basis upon which to structure gov-
ernment in the public interest. Merger of
these two boards would enable a single
board to regulate an entire industry-as
opposed to the current structure where
two separate boards regulate parts of the
same industry, each often vying for com-
petitive advantage vis-a-vis the other and
using the police power offices of the
state in the struggle. The fragmented na-
ture of the state's current regulation of
the death services industry has resulted
in long-unchecked abuses which victim-
ize consumers.
Second, merger of the two boards
would eliminate consumer confusion
which results from the existence of two
boards. When consumers feel victimized
by a member of the death services in-
dustry, they are frequently unable to de-
termine which board to complain to
and-historically-have been given the
"runaround" by both boards, as indicated
by the almost moribund enforcement
numbers listed above.
Third, a merger would create efficien-
cies in the boards' enforcement systems.
Currently, if a BFDE inspector goes to
a dual-licensed premises, he/she is per-
mitted to inspect only the funeral direc-
tor/embalming aspects of the operation.
That inspector is not authorized to in-
spect the cemetery/crematory aspect; that
requires a visit from a CB inspector (if
it has one). Additionally, a merged board
with one fund could establish an auditing
unit which could audit both preneed trust
funds of funeral directors and endow-
ment care funds of cemetery licensees.
The Protests of the Boards and the
Industry Are Too Little, Too Late.
Both boards have consistently opposed a
merger or restructuring, and so does the
death services industry. Their arguments
should be rejected once and for all.
- "But we have new leadership!"
Both boards argue they have new exec-
utive officers who are capable of leading
the boards out of their decades-long mal-
aise. However, neither board had any-
thing to do with the firing of their pre-
vious executive officers. The resigna-
tions of these individuals (James Allen
and John Gill) came at the behest of As-
semblymember Speier and DCA Director
Conran. But for the actions of Speier and
Conran, Jim Allen and John Gill would
still be in charge of these boards.
- "But our enforcement statistics have
improved!" If in fact they have, this "im-
provement" has occurred only in the past
six months and is directly due to the pen-
dency of SB 2037 (many agencies threat-
ened with abolition suddenly spring to
life), the September 1993 Death Summit,
the Senate Subcommittee hearing in Oc-
tober 1993, and the actions of As-
semblymember Speier and DCA Director
Conran.
-"But we were powerless to effectu-
ate change!" At the May 9, 1994 hearing
on SB 2037 before the Senate Business
and Professions Committee, the trade as-
sociations of the death services industry
complained that they are not to blame
for the boards' poor performance, and
stated that they recognized the serious
problems in the industry but were "pow-
erless" to do anything about Allen, Gill,
or either board. Actually, industry oppo-
sition stalled or killed every effort (ad-
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mittedly, there were few) by either board
to adopt regulations to remedy common
abuses. If industry representatives were
so concerned about inadequate regula-
tion, they could have petitioned the
boards to adopt regulations or sponsored
reform legislation; they did neither.
- "But a funeral home is completely
different from a cemetery or crematory!"
This argument is also unpersuasive. Sev-
eral DCA boards and bureaus regulate
two or more segments of an industry;
29
these agencies are completely capable of
recognizing any meaningful differences
between the industry components and
regulating accordingly. Other DCA agen-
cies successfully regulate two distinct-
and sometimes competing-trades or pro-
fessions.30 There is no reason a merged en-
tity could not successfully regulate the en-
tire death services industry.
After 14 years of watching these
boards permit consumers to be abused
and victimized instead of policing abuses
and regulating the death services indus-
try in the public interest, CPIL urges the
Wilson administration and the legislature
to withstand the pressure now being ex-
erted by both boards, the affected trade
associations which long to maintain the
status quo, and other alleged "consumer
groups"-which are in reality tied to the
death services industry.
Consumers have a right to a regula-
tory mechanism which makes sense and
which attacks prevalent abuses in an in-
dustry. The current system is so bad that
no system is preferable; it is better to
have nothing to rely on and know it, than
to rely on empty promises and unful-
filled obligations.
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